Endnotes to "The Marines" a chapter in "Cursed Is the Peacemaker: The American Diplomat Versus the Israeli General, Beirut 1982" by John Boykin. Copyright © 2002 by Applegate Press All rights reserved, including the right of reproduction in whole or in part in any form PLEASE NOTE: As in the printed book, each endnote below begins with a page number and a few key words to peg the note to the passage to which it refers. Unlike the printed book, though, the Web has no page numbers. So it will be somewhat more difficult to associate any given note here with its passage than it is in the printed book. A name and a date (for example, "Mead 6-5-94") indicate an interview. A name and a page number (for example, "Sharon, p. 503") indicate a book. Declassified State Department cables are cited in the notes by city of origin, cable number, and date/time. Most cables cited use military time, with a 24-hour clock, so 21 means 9 p.m. Z stands for “Zulu,” shorthand for Greenwich Mean Time. Example: 062147Z Jul 82 means July 6, 1982, at 9:47 p.m. GMT. Some of the declassified documents cited in this chapter have a different format, because they either are not a State Department cable or are some kind of document other than a cable. You can open the sample chapter in a separate browser window if it is not already. Download sample chapter and endnotes in PDF form Marines chapter | Editing and Writing page | Home 205 He needed: Mead 6-5-94 205 Handful: As early as July 3, the day Reagan approved American participation in the MNF, Habib asked that French-speaking Marine liaison officers be identified and placed on standby to come meet with him. "But I don’t [want] them to come until I know that we have something. That may be tomorrow, it may be the next day" (Johnston 12-4-96; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, "TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 P.M., July 3, 1982," p. 4). Habib specified that he wanted Marine officers who spoke French because French would be the first or second language of most of the participants in these meetings. Though the liaisons had been chosen in early July, one flare-up or another made it pointless for them to come ashore. 205 USS Guam: Smith 6-21-94; Mead 6-5-94. Commodore Richard White and Adm. William Rowden of the Sixth Fleet were also present. 205 Maronite: The Palestinians hated the Maronites even more than they did the Israelis. A chant heard in the streets of West Beirut during the siege was "Even Sharon, but not Maron"–i.e., the Maronites (Mikdadi, p. 84). 206 Buffer: Smith 11-25-96. Sharon’s original plan called for the Lebanese Christian forces, the Phalange, to enter West Beirut and kill the PLO once the IDF had the city surrounded. Though Sharon was disappointed that the Phalange had so far basically sat out the war, the PLO feared that the Phalange would strike at the first opportunity. The two had, after all, been regularly killing each other in the civil war that had raged from 1976 until interrupted by Sharon’s invasion. 206 Sandwich: Mead 6-5-94; Sehulster 6-23-94 206 Marine responses to Habib: Mead 6-5-94; Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94. Disarming the Palestinians had been a goal of Habib, Washington, and Lebanese leaders since the early days of the invasion (Habib cable Beirut 04233, 161325Z Jun 82, par. 1C and 3F; NEA Veliotes memo to Bremer 8217953, "Recorded Radio Report from Habib, 1800, June 25, 1982–Late Afternoon Meeting with Sarkis," 6-25-82, p. 2). In fact, the goal of disarming them was a given even before the idea of an evacuation emerged (Hill 7-9-94). It was always assumed that disarming them would be one of the MNF’s basic jobs. 206-7 Attitude, guys from Brooklyn: Mead 6-5-94 207 Always outnumbered: Draper ADST oral history. Peacekeepers is an unfortunate term that inevitably raises platitudinous objections that there is no peace to keep. Calming forces would be a much more apt term. 207 Impossibilities, consent: Smith 6-21-94 207 Marines chosen: Johnston and Smith were aboard a ship in the Mediterranean; Sehulster and Gaucher were working in Germany awaiting the call to go to the region and didn’t actually go until August 6 (Sehulster letter to the author 1-12-97). After early consultations with Habib ashore, Johnston would need to be on ship to make preparations for the Marines to land, so he would be relieved ashore by Smith. 207 Matter of days: Hill 7-21-94 207 August 7: Johnston 12-4-96 207 General outline: Johnston cable, USMC 2 07 Aug 2030Z, to Cmdr. White and Col. Mead 207-8 Textbook: Johnston 12-4-96 208 Ongoing obstacle: Hill 7-21-94 208 Ridiculous: Draper 5-4-93 208 Matter of command, overall commander: Johnston 12-4-96; Lewis cable Tel Aviv 12139, 101505Z Aug 82, par. 5 208 Dirty work, dollies: Johnston 12-4-96. During this first meeting ashore Habib also emphasized how important it was to give the LAF a role suitable to the army of a sovereign country. 208 Good spirits, close out: Johnston cable USMC 2 07 Aug 2030Z, to Cmdr. White and Col. Mead; Hill 7-21-94 209 Helicopters and Israeli jets: Account compiled from Sehulster 7-12-94 and 11-24-96; Draper 4-25-93; Gaucher 5-15-94; Geske 6-5-94; Johnston 12-4-96; Kerlek 12-8-96; Frank p. 11; and Johnston (CTF Six Zero) cable LIAA00144 to COMSIXTHFLT 111011Z Aug 82. Kerlek was the pilot of the lead Huey; Sehulster, Johnston, and Gaucher were on board; Geske was in charge of the Hueys. Geske says the Marine helicopters that flew Habib typically flew in pairs 100 feet apart. Sehulster says the jets came within 20 or 30 feet; other estimates by people not in the helicopters at the time range up to 200 feet. Even 200 feet is extremely close for a jet to pass by a helicopter. The Pentagon and State Department were anxious to keep the Marine liaisons’ meeting with Habib secret (Howe memo to Eagleburger, "Lebanon Checklist," 8-5-82, 8223325, p. 1). So the liaisons had been instructed to keep a low profile, making day trips ashore in civilian clothes to meet with Habib and spending nights on ship (Johnston 12-4-96). 209 Reported the incident: Kerlek 12-8-96 209-10 Intention to issue orders: Sehulster 11-24-96. In the words of Johnston’s official cable, the Marines requested authority to scramble an armed fighter escort to "take harassing action" at the first hint of any encore (Johnston [CTF Six Zero] cable LIAA00084, 071835Z Aug 82). This was the Marines’ closest and most dangerous encounter with the IAF, but not their first. Johnston’s report on the incident mentioned without elaboration that "Previous flights to and from Junieh had been intercepted by what were believed to be Israeli aircraft" (cable LIAA00144). 210 Should a hostile act: Cable LIAA00112 from COMSIXTHFLT 090951Z Aug 92. 210 Protested, apologized: Shultz, p. 63-64. Israeli officials told an American diplomat in Tel Aviv that the helicopters were buzzed because they had not coordinated their flight with the IDF. They said it was not harassment and was no problem. Begin told Habib that the Israelis were suspicious because the French had said they would be in touch with the IDF and had not been. The Americans rejected such explanations, pointing out that they were not trying to keep the French from talking to the IDF and that the French had nothing to talk about with the IDF yet since they had not yet met with Habib’s MNF planning team (Hill 7-10-94 and 7-21-94). NEA suspected the incidents described here stem from "Sharon’s entirely mistaken suspicion that we were transporting French military personnel as part of a French attempt to enter Beirut before an agreement is reached. We have told the Israelis that this is utter nonsense" (Evening Reading Item "Israelis Harass U.S. Helicopter," 8-8-82). 210-11 Detainment incident: Account compiled primarily from Sehulster 11-24-96; also from Sehulster 7-12-94; Gaucher 5-15-94; Johnston 12-4-96; Frank, p. 11; cable LIAA00102 from COMSIXTHFLT and USCINCEUR to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 081315Z Aug 82; Kerlak 12-8-96; Shultz memorandum for the president, "Status Report on Lebanon," 8-9-82, 0223742. Johnston’s version is quite different from Sehulster’s and Gaucher’s: He says he never felt captured or threatened, that the Israelis never surrounded the Americans, and that Col. Yahya just insisted on giving them an unwanted escort to Yarze. Johnston considered this just "a little bit of arrogance by the Israelis." He agrees that the IAF was monitoring their ship and their helicopter flights (Johnston 12-4-96). 211 Unglued: Sehulster 7-12-94 211 Phone: Gaucher 5-15-94. The general was Amir Drori (Sharon, p. 503). 211 Power play, sandbox: Sehulster 7-12-94; Johnston 12-4-96. Washington strongly protested this helicopter incident too. Begin sent his personal apologies (Shultz memo to The President, 8-9-82, 8223742). 211 Stay ashore: Johnston 12-4-96 211 As though nothing: Sehulster 11-24-96. He did, however, forbid the Marines to have any direct dealings with the Israelis. They would, of course, have to have some dealings, but those must always be in their capacity as members of Habib’s political/military committee for the multinational force, not as US Marines. The IDF was anxious to have highly visible meetings with the American military, but Habib was determined to avoid any appearance of the Americans being in cahoots with the Israelis in their war (Johnston 12-4-96). Sharon had repeatedly said he wanted an IDF representative to be a member of the MNF planning group. Habib had repeatedly refused (Hill 7-21-94). As late as August 18, the Israelis were still demanding to know why they were not included as members of the MNF (Johnston 12-4-96). The Israelis were pointedly not invited (Sehulster 7-12-94; Smith 6-21-94), but Habib would send representatives of the committee to brief the IDF every morning on how the plan was evolving. Because of the buzzing and detainment incidents, though, Habib specifically instructed them to drag their feet at every opportunity about giving the IDF any information that might provide better insight into what the MNF was doing (Sehulster 7-12-94; Smith 6-21-94). While these Americans would meet with the Israelis, some of the Lebanese army officers in the meetings served as liaisons with the PLO. 211-12 Habib’s helicopter: Entire story Draper 4-25-93 and 9-19-97. Date and time per Beirut 05272, 101300Z Aug 82 and Beirut 05282, 101515Z Aug 82. Draper says Habib never even reported the incident to Washington, but an official of the Near East Asia bureau recalls having heard about it at the time. Habib confided the story to his University of Idaho classmates at a 1985 reunion, quoting himself telling the Israelis, "Get the hell out of here! That’s for me!" (Easterbrook 2-21-94). The Beirut embassy had sent word to the Tel Aviv embassy to notify the Israelis of Habib’s flight plans in advance (Beirut 05272, 101300Z Aug 82). Schiff and Ya’ari tell an abbreviated version of the story on p. 223-24. In their version, Sharon ordered his troops to Junieh to prevent American helicopters from landing French troops on the beach. IDF jeeps scurried around the tarmac to keep this helicopter from landing. Draper arrived (their version does not place Habib himself at the scene) and screeched "That’s Habib’s helicopter!" The IDF troops were gone a few hours later. Schiff and Ya’ari give August 8 as the date of the incident. The declassified documents give no indication of any Habib trip to Israel between July 28 and August 10. 212 Surrendering, shelter: Smith 11-25-96, 6-14-94, and 6-21-94 212 Land mines: Sehulster 6-23-94. The LAF had virtually no mine-clearing capability (Johnston cable, USMC 2, Beirut 5311, 11 Aug). The French did send some of their soldiers out with the LAF to clear land mines and booby traps. After three or four of them got blown up, they backed out (Sehulster 6-23-94). Habib knew quite well from personal experience how dangerous mine clearing was, having been required during his WWII service to probe for mines by poking bayonets in the ground (Draper 9-19-97). 212 Buffer along Green Line: Sehulster 6-23-94 213 Signal: Sehulster 11-23-96 213 Bone of contention: Sehulster 6-23-94. As the guy on the ground who had actually looked at the places Habib had in mind for the Marines to go, Sehulster found himself in the awkward position of having to tell his superiors that Habib’s idea was "far less dangerous" than they thought, while telling Habib that it was more dangerous than he thought. Though Sehulster did not support Habib’s idea, his superiors accused him of being too close to the situation and too sympathetic to Habib (Sehulster 6-23-94). 213 Veto: Sehulster 6-23-94. The decision was made by the US Commander in Chief in Europe, almost certainly with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Sehulster letter to the author 1-12-97). 213 Let it drop: Mead 11-25-96 213 Grasp: Smith 6-14-94; Johnston 12-4-96. Both Smith and Johnston talk about some of Habib’s utterly unworkable military ideas, and in the next breath say things like "he had a good sense for what was in the art of the doable from a military standpoint" (Johnston 12-4-96). They apparently reconcile the two themes by Habib’s willingness to listen to their comebacks, learn quickly from their feedback, and revise his ideas accordingly. 213 Personal level: Sehulster 7-12-94. This contrasts markedly with his treatment of fellow Foreign Service Officers, to whom he rarely expressed appreciation. 213 Fairly gush: Smith 6-9-94, 6-14-94, and 6-21-94; Mead 6-5-94; Johnston 12-4-96; Sehulster 7-12-94 213-14 Kept apprised, Pentagon, freewheeling: Mead 6-5-94 214 Unprecedented: Shultz 9-16-93 214 Nobody knew: Mead 11-25-96 214 Left it to Mead: Mead 1-19-97; Sehulster letter to the author 1-12-97. Sehulster adds, "We, of course, always advised our seniors of such decisions. I do not know of any being overturned." 214 Tactical command: Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94 214-15 Issuing directions, responsible guys: Johnston 12-4-96; NEA Veliotes memo to S/S Bremer, 8218794, "TelCon Habib and Charles Hill/Adm. Howe, 12:07 P.M., July 3, 1982," p. 4 215 Full authority: Sehulster 6-23-94; Smith 6-14-94 215 Why can’t you, LAF: Sehulster 6-23-94; Johnston 12-4-96. The Lebanese Armed Forces were capable of little more than getting out of bed in the morning. But, this being their own country, Habib had bent over backwards to involve them. He asked the LAF to come up with a plan for going into West Beirut in advance of the MNF. But the LAF generals were extremely cautious and loathe to commit themselves to anything that might upset the Israelis, the Syrians, or anyone else. 215 Driven: Smith 6-21-94; Johnston 12-4-96 215 Stay until they did, mahogany: Smith 6-14-94 and 6-21-94 215 Sit at the middle: Sehulster 6-23-94 215-16 Map on floor: Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-23-96. This happened August 11 when Habib returned from Israel with Cabinet acceptance in principle of the plan. His helicopter touched down in Junieh at 4:15 P.M., and he started the meeting as soon as he drove back to Yarze. 216 Three words: Tueni 11-15-95. Draper says, "He did not speak Arabic, but many of the phrases were familiar to him from his childhood, especially the curse words" (Draper ADST oral history). Howell says "As far as I know, he didn’t speak any of the language. He may have known a few words, but I never saw him use the language" (Howell 10-11-93). 216 Holy Ghost: Mead 6-5-94. The nickname is based on Acts, chapter 2, in the Bible. That chapter recounts the Holy Spirit (or Holy Ghost) filling Jesus’ apostles and suddenly enabling them to speak in languages they did not previously know. 216 Routinely: Smith 6-21-94 and 6-14-94 216 Italian: Sehulster 6-23-94; Mead 6-5-94. They were almost certainly mistaken. 216 Political officer: Crocker 4-25-94. Habib says "Arabic was probably my first language, because my parents did not speak English to one another. I spoke sort of a simple Arabic, colloquial Arabic as a child" (Habib interview with Tueni). Dillon says Habib’s Arabic was better than people give him credit for (Dillon 12-31-97). 216 Positive impact: Sehulster 6-23-94 216 Swore beautifully: Mead 6-5-94 216 Lapsed into French: Smith 6-21-94; Johnston 12-4-96. When Habib had first asked the US military to send liaisons, he specified that he wanted ones fluent in French (Smith 6-21-94). 216-17 French volunteered: Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-23-96; Draper 12-22-93 217 French do everything, agenda, envy, excuse: Sehulster 11-23-96; Gaucher 5-15-94 217 Liked Henry: Dillon 11-5-96 and 11-24-96; Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-23-96 217 Mistress: Dillon 11-16-96 217 How many girls: Gaucher 5-15-94 218 Weird, unthinkable, fini, race: Sehulster 6-23-94 and 11-24-96; Gaucher 5-15-94 218 Dinner party: Sehulster 6-23-94, 6-23-96, and 6-24-96 218 Worried: Pascoe 6-4-94 218-19 Stress: Sehulster 6-23-94; Barrett 5-9-94; Lee 10-2-94; Pascoe 6-4-94 219 Heart pill, bedroom: Sehulster 6-23-94 219 Always worried: Mead 6-5-94 You can open the sample chapter in a separate browser window if it is not already. Download sample chapter and endnotes in PDF form Top of page | Marines chapter | Editing and Writing page | Home